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INTRODUCTION

The ARAMCO Cases' expose an unsettled issue of international
tax law: Under what method and with what justification should tax
authorities be empowered to reallocate profits assigned by a
corporation to a particular tax jurisdiction?2
The Internal
Revenue Service's primary concern under these circumstances is to
prevent multinational corporations from avoiding United States
taxation by allocating their income to foreign tax jurisdictions.3
A. The Problem Defined
The political and economic importance of crude oil as a
commodity creates unique difficulties for government authorities
trying to justify unilateral reallocation of petroleum industry
profits solely for tax purposes. 4 In 1988, prior to the outset of
the ARAMCO Cases, a study conducted by the Treasury criticized
current-law approaches to profit reallocation methodology in the
income tax regulations' promulgated pursuant to Internal Revenue

Code § 482.6

International tax articles addressing this subject

have traditionally focused on the theoretical debate
practicality and viability of current tax law.7
This

of the
comment

1. For the purpose of this paper, the "ARAMCO cases" are the pending claims
against Texaco, Exxon, Chevron and Mobil filed by the Internal Revenue Service
[hereinafter the Service] in the United States Tax Court, No. 24855-89. These
companies own the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). The ARAMCO shareholders
are defendants in pending multi-billion dollar law suits recently consolidated.
The claims arose from the Service's challenge to prices declared by the
companies, for oil purchased from Saudi Arabia, and used internally, between 1979
and 1981. WALL Smzrr Jou vAL, August 17, 1990, at A4, col. 1.
2. Brief for Respondent at 6, Texaco, Inc. v. C.I.R., No-24855-89 (U.S.T.C.
filed Dec. 24, 1990). [hereinafter Brief of Respondent].
3. see Id. See also Texaco Case Called Part of Growing Crackdown, NEW Yo x
Tzs, Jan. 15, 1988, at D4, col. 1. "The I.R.S. . . . contends the oil should
have been accounted for at a price closer to the world market price. (Not at the
lower prices at which the companies were able to purchase it]." Id.
4. Texaco Case called Part of Growing Crackdown, NEW YoR Tmz~s, Jan. 15, 1988,
at D4, col. 1.
5. Treas. Reg. 5 1.482-2 et seq (1991).
6. I.R.C. S 482 (1986). Section 482 states in part: "in any case of two or
more organizations, trades, or businesses . . . owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests, the secretary may distribute, apportion, or
allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such
organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution,
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes
or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades or
businesses." Id.
7. See, e.g., Stanley I. Langbein, Transaction Cost, Production Cost and Tax
Transfer Pricing, TAX NoTEs, September 18, 1989, at 1391, (this article suggests
a theoretical solution to tax transfer pricing problems); Marc M. Levey and
Stanley C. Ruchelman, Section 482-The Super Royalty Provisions Adopt The
Commensurate with Income standard, 41 TAx LAwYER 611 (1988); Stanley I. Langbein,
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analyzes practical problems of applying current § 482 methodology
to the petroleum industry and the viability of suggested
theoretical alternatives.8
These alternatives are: the White
Paper9 approach and the transaction cost analysis proposed by
Professor Langbein in his article, Transaction Cost, Production
Cost, and Tax Transfer Pricing." This comment suggests a possible

solution to comparable uncontrolled pricing methodologies. Since
a practical analysis is the goal of this comment, the analytical
framework relies on both factual and hypothetical illustrations of
petroleum industry practices.
The United States regulated profit allocation as early as
1917, under the War Revenue Act."1 Section 45 of the Revenue Act
of 1928,12 was the predecessor of present I.R.C. S 482.
The
purpose of code § 45 was to prevent tax evasion by corporations
through the use of transfer pricing policies. 13
Current
regulations promulgated pursuant to S 482 were enacted in 1968. 14
Apart from the addition to § 482 in 1986,5 of a sentence which
established a standard for evaluating transfers of intangible
assets, the intention of § 482 has not changed. 6
The fundamental issue under scrutiny of tax experts is whether
the methods prescribed by § 482's regulations achieve the statute's
intended result.17 The method most susceptible to criticism is a
comparison by the Service of the prices found in an arm's length
9
transaction"8 with the price actually used for the controlled"

The Unitary Method and the Myth

of

Arm's Length,

TAX

NoTs, February 17, 1986, at

625.
8. In Part IV, solutions to practical problems of applying current S 482
methodology to the petroleum industry are addressed. The viability of suggested
theoretical alternatives is also discussed.
9.

TREASURY DEPARTmENT, SECTION 482 WHIT

PAPER ON INTER-CoMPANY PRICING (October 1988)

[hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
10. TAx NOTES, September 18, 1989, at 1391.
11. JOINT CoxITrE ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND CERTAIN
SECTION 482),

(comm.

Print JCS-22-90)

ISSUES RELATING To TRANSFER PRICING (CODE

[hereinafter JCOT PAPER].

12. Id. at 3363.
13. Id. at 3363. "The purpose of that provision was to prevent [tax] evasion
[by corporate] shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales, and other
methods frequently adopted for the purpose of milking, and in order clearly to
reflect their true taxable liability." Id.
14. Treas Reg. S 1.482-2 et seq. (1968).
15. I.R.C. S 482 (1986).
16. Id.
17. Treas Reg. S 1.482-2 et seq (1991).
18. "[A]n arms length transaction [is] defined in law as a transaction
between two unconnected parties, in which price is the sole consideration, and
which does not involve provisions for resale to a third connected party." ROBERT
MABRO ET. AL.,
STUDY] .

TE MARXET FOR NORTH SEA CRUDE OIL, at 123-124

(1986)

[hereinafter TE MASRO
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The implementation of arm's length
transaction in question.20
prices as a tax reference price provides the basis for much complex
2
litigation.
The Service's concern in transfer pricing cases, is that a
corporation may shift income between tax jurisdictions by altering
the price at which it transfers goods and services between
For instance, a corporation could set a low
affiliated groups.2 2
price for its internal transfer from a jurisdiction with a higher
corporate income tax rate and consequently reduce its taxable
Conversely, increased profit is
income in that jurisdiction.
realized in the jurisdiction which receives the low-cost product,
thereby capitalizing on that jurisdiction's lower income tax rate.
The Service's cause for concern in these cases is that both
parties to the transaction are controlled by the same corporation,
especially where a parent company owns a number of affiliates
incorporated in different tax jurisdictions. The parent company
can dictate policies for inter-affiliate transfers based on
considerations other than price.23 Section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 allows the Service to examine controlled
transactions and reallocate income where profit shifting in
affiliated organizations intends to avoid taxation.2 4
Arm's length methods used to analyze transfer prices under §
482 have, and continue to be challenged from a theoretical
perspective.25 Their foremost critics contend that application of
these methods fails to account for synergies arguably inherent in
The critics claim these methods
multinational enterprises.2'
result in a continuum of prices rather than a single price that
would satisfy the requirements of § 482.27 This continuum-creates

19. An inter-affiliate transfer of goods is termed a "controlled"
It is distinguishable from an "arm's length" transaction which
transaction.
occurs between two unrelated parties. See Treas. Reg. S 1.482-1.
20. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(2) (1991).
21. See supra note 1.

22. JCOT

PAPER,

supra note 11, at 3359, 3360.

.23. Cf. Treas. Reg. s 1.482-1(b) (1991).
24. I.R.C. S 482 (1986).
25. see, e.g., stanley I. Langbein, Transaction Cost, Production Cost and
Tax Transfer Pricing, TAX NoTzs, September 18, 1989, at 1391 (This article suggests

a theoretical solution to tax transfer pricing problems);

Marc M. Levey and

482-The Super Royalty Provisions Adopt The
Commensurate With Income Standard, 41 TAX LAWYER 611 (1988); Note, Multinational
Corporations And Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
code, 89 HARv. L. Rzv. 1202 (1976)."
26. See infra Part II.
27. see Langbein supra note 25, at 1392.
Stanley

C.

Ruchelman,

Section
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28
apportioned between the two entities.

law, is
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arbitrarily

This comment questions the applicability of current methods of
determining arm's length prices for purposes of reallocation and
the viability of suggested solutions to the continuum price problem
in the taxation of international transfers of crude oil. Part (I)
reevaluates present arm's length methods of analyzing multinational
corporations' transfer prices for S 482 reallocation purposes.
Part (II) discusses the major challenge to present methods used 29 :
the continuum price problem. Part (III) defines a model for the
structure of the petroleum industry to evaluate the pricing bases
for crude oil transfers and factors that influence price. Part
(IV) examines the tax consequences of crude oil transfer pricing in
light of the arm's length standard and the continuum price problem.
B. Problems With Taxation and Transfer Price
Regulation in the Petroleum Industry

The Challenge: Transfers of petroleum between affiliates in
different
tax
jurisdictions
are
not
freely
negotiated.3"
Therefore, two related entities may set prices to avoid taxation"
or apportion prices so that income realized by each entity does.not
reflect its contribution to overall income.32
For example, oil company X's United Kingdom affiliate extracts
crude oil from the North Sea and sells it to the company's United
States refining affiliate.
If the tax rate of the selling
affiliate in the United Kingdom is 95 percent and the tax rate of
the purchasing affiliate in the United States is 33 percent, for
every dollar of profit by which the sales price is decreased,
company X's profit is increased by sixty two cents and the United
Kingdom's tax revenue is reduced by ninety five cents. North Sea
production is approximately 2.5 million barrels per day,3 3 and
prices have recently ranged between $16 and $40 per barrel.

28. Id.
29. stanley I. Langbein, Langbein says Arm's-Length Method Is Unworkable,
T x Noms, September 3, 1990, at 1317.
30. See supra note 2, at 14. Crude oil was sold at non-arm's length prices
resulting in a shifting of income between two commonly-owned and controlled
entities. Id.
31. JCOT PPER, supra note 11, at 3360. "Due to the variance in tax rates
(and tax systems) among countries and possibly for other reasons, a multinational
enterprise may have a strong incentive to shift income, deductions, or tax
credits among commonly controlled entities to the entity in the most favorable
tax jurisdiction in order to arrive at a reduced overall tax burden." Id.
32. Langbein, supra note 27 (a solution suggested to the transfer pricing
problem would require each affiliate's income to reflect its percentage of
contribution to generating that income); See also infra Part IV (c).
33. The 1983 figure was 2.36 mb/d and the 1984 figure was 2.58 mb/d. see THE
MAsRO STMY, supra note 13, at 7.
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A Theoretical Response: Transfer pricing methods have been
studied by both tax , and managerial experts.3 4
Contrary to
assumptions made by the Service, managerial studies of transfer
pricing indicate that companies do not determine transfer prices
solely for tax reasons.3 s Management theory contends that transfer
pricing practices are influenced by both corporate strategy and
administrative process.3" Favorable economic results and corporate
performance are significant to this model. 31
The effect of
transfer pricing policies on lower-level management performance and
evaluation is equally important.3"
Since companies expend
substantial amounts of money and effort developing transfer pricing
policies, 3
post-facto reallocations of profit by the Service
negate these efforts and result in double taxation or unrecoverable

costs.
The Complexity: The Service's response to the 1979 oil crisis
illustrates how implementation of the present arm's length methods
can produce problems. 4
In an effort to offset the effects of the
1979 oil price shock on consuming nations, Saudi Arabia sold crude
oil to the ARAMCO 4 group at prices substantially below spot
market42 prices.43
The sale was conditioned on savings being

34. E.g.,
DEPARTMENT,

ROBERT EccLEs, THE TRAssFHE PRICING PROBLzM A THEORY FOR PRACTICE (1985) ; TRzASu Y
SECTION 482 WHITE PAPER ON INTERCOMPANY PRICING (October 18, 1988).

35. See generally ROBERT

EccLEs,

TEE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM A THEORY FOR PRACTICE (1985).

"[T]he role of transfer prices is to allocate resources within the firm, under
the assumption that managers are motivated to maximize [pre-tax] profits of their
division because at least some of their rewards are tied to divisional financial
performance." Id. at 21.
36. Id.
37. Id..
38. Id. at 39.
39. Id. at 8.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. The ARAMCO .group was initially founded by SOCAL (now Chevron
Corporation) on November 8, 1933. It currently-has four shareholders, Chevron,
Texaco, Exxon and Mobil.
Prior to 1972, ARAMCO owned certain rights in a
concession agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG). In 1973, SAG
purchased 25% of ARAmCO's assets. SAG purchased another 35% in 1974 and the
remaining 40% in 1976. SAG now controls production, disposition and initial
selling price of its oil by ARAMCO. See supra note 2, at 8.
42. The spot market is the name given to the totality of individual physical
cargo purchases and sales of crude oil. About 5 to 15 per cent of the crude oil
extracted and refined is thought to be traded on the spot market. It is not a
market as such and is not physically located in any one place, though it is often
associated with the port of Rotterdam. Spot purchases and sales occur worldwide,
whenever and wherever buyers and sellers make a contract. Some spot transactions
are done free on board (F.O.B.) the export loading ports. Many quantities of spot

crude oil are bought and sold on a delivered basis to end-user markets such as
Rotterdam, the U.S. Gulf coast and Japan.
ANALYsIs

PAUL VERLEGER, OIL MAREETS IN TVRXOIL AN EcoNoMIc

264 (1982).

43.

Brief of

Petitioner, at 5, Texaco,

Inc.

v. C.I.R.,

No.

(U.S.T.C. filed Dec. 21, 1990). [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner].

24855-89
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It is reasonable to assume
(i) to prevent a movement

passed through to consuming nations."
two primary reasons for this action:

toward future conversion to alternative energy sources;
prevent balance of payments 4

on foreign oil.
a tax

The Service challenged the use of

reference

price

(ii)

to

crises among the nations dependent

the Saudi

The reallocations proposed

contract price as the transfer price.

use

75

that more

closely reflects

market

price. 41 At the time, however, the oil companies were effectively
employed as agents of the Saudi government and so had to "passthrough" savings to consuming nations. 41 Inappropriate action by

the companies would have threatened their continued operation in
Saudi Arabia.4"
The companies' distribution structure was
established, and, as such, alternative government-to-government

deals were viewed as less efficient.

Passing through the savings

on a basis to which recipient consuming nations assented was
essential to the oil companies' continued role in importing,
Consuming nations
refining and distributing in these countries.49
or the Saudi government could have avoided or terminated the
agreement by negotiating directly with each other. Notwithstanding

44. Id. at 5. "As part of Saudi Arabia's price moderation policy, the Saudi
Arabian government required Texaco and Exxon's off-takers of Saudi crudes to
resell those crudes to related and unrelated third parties at prices no higher
than those established by the saudi Arabian government during the years 1979-81."
Id.
45. "Balance of payments" refers to the current account balance (CAB). CAB
represents the difference between Gross National Product (GNP) and domestic
absorption. For purposes of this paper, a nation's balance of payments may be
understood as the degree to which internal tax revenues fall short of
expenditures, forcing the government to borrow the balance. CAB represents a
country's overall financial position. when CAB is positive, a country will
purchase foreign securities. conversely, when CAB is negative, a country must
To encourage foreign purchase of
encourage foreigners to purchase its debt.
government securities a nation must raise its interest rates, an inflationary
event.
Oil is traded in dollars, thus, increased oil prices increase dollar demand
and value on world currency markets. A price shock exponentially increases the
quantity of a country's own hard currency needed to purchase its oil
requirements. This is a result of higher domestic inflation and increased value
of the U.S. dollar. This problem is aggravated by the OPEC nations investment
of profits in dollar-denominated investments, further increasing dollar demand
and increasing burdens on consumer nations. The result is sudden increases in.
This creates a CAB deficit and
government spending by consuming nations.
requires increased interest rates to attract foreign investment.
46. Brief of Respondent, at 10. The Service contends that Exxon and Texaco,
through their relationship with the saudi Arabian government were able to realize
large profits from the sale of crude oil which they were able to purchase at a
reduced price. Id.
47. see Brief of Petitioner, at 4. By 1976, the Saudi Arabian government
For convenience the ARAMCO
controlled all of ARAMCO's former assets.
shareholders were permitted to continue to exploit the saudi crude. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5. "Many of the major consuming countries, including the United
States, regulated product prices during all or part of the period 1979-81." Id.
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the purchase arrangements, the Service contends that the ARAMCO
shareholders should have sold their oil to consuming nations at the
official OPEC market price."0
The official price was as much as
$7 per barrel higher than that used by the ARAMCO companies."
Increased profits realized in the United States would result in
increased tax payments."
In addition to the Service's position, the industry has never
before been challenged nor has it responded to an argument that
their pricing methods do not reflect proper distribution of taxable
income. 53
Industry practice is to attribute most, and in some
cases all of the profits from producing, refining and marketing to
the upstream affiliates.54
Within this framework, arm's length methods55 of determining
transfer prices, and use of the spot market or other intermediary
prices as a tax reference price, will be analyzed.
I. CURRENT-LAw METHODS OF DETERMINING ARM'S LENGTH PRICE
A. An Analysis of I.R.C. S 482

Internal Revenue Code S 482, authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to redetermine the income that it believes is properly the
income of a United States entity when it appears that an improper
shifting of income between the United States entity and a commonly
controlled entity in another country has occurred.5 6
The code
section makes no reference to specific reallocation rules that must
be followed, aside from establishing general standards: the
prevention of tax evasion and clearly reflecting income."'

50. Id. at 10. "SAG [the Saudi Arabian government] . . . sold through ARAMCO
to the four shareholders the remaining 6,645,000,000 (93%) [of the crude] at
prices that were as much as $7 per barrel less than oils . . . sold by other OPEC
members to the shareholders and the shareholders, competitors." Id.
51. Id. at 10.
52. See Id.
53. See Langbein, supra note 32, at 1392. Transaction cost theory contends
that every affiliate of an integrated organization serves an economic purpose.
The actual profits or losses of an affiliate may not reflect its contribution to
overall profits as its existence may protect revenues generated by a sister
affiliate. Id.
54. See VERLEGER, supra note 42.
55. Treas. Reg. 5 1.482-1(d)(3) (1991). Arm's Length, means the amount that
would have been charged in an independent transaction between unrelated parties
under the same or similar circumstances considering all relevant facts. Id.
56. I.R.C. S 482 (1986); see also JCOT PAPzR, supra note 11, at 3363.
57. I.R.C. S 482 (1986). Section 482 states in part: "In any case of two or
more organizations, trades, or businesses ... owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or
allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such
organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution,
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Treasury regulations adopt the arm's length standard as the method
of determining whether reallocations are appropriate.5 8
When
reallocation occurs, the substituted price is generally referred to
as a tax reference price.
The purpose of S 482 is to place a
controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer,
by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled
taxpayer, the true taxable income from the property and business of
a controlled taxpayer."
Regulations promulgated pursuant to § 48260 provide three
methods for determining the arm's length price for transfers
between controlled entities. 6" Application of the methods must be
attempted in the order in which they are found in the
regulations.62 A subsequent method may not be employed unless the
preceding method has been shown to be unsuitable. 63
The burden
lies with the taxpayer to show that any of the three methods are
inappropriate by establishing that another method is "clearly more
appropriate.

,64

6
(i) The Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method (CUP) 5

The Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method evaluates pricing of
transactions between the affiliated companies by comparing
uncontrolled and controlled transactions.66
Under this method
"[c]omparability exists if substantially the same products are sold
under the same circumstances, or if differences in the property or
circumstances either have no effect on prices or can be measured
and eliminated with a reasonable number of adjustments., 67
The
Service is authorized to use uncontrolled comparables to establish
the controlled group's tax basis."
Tax reference prices are
computed by altering the controlled taxpayer's transfer price to
reflect arm's length prices.6'

apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes
or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades or
businesses." Id.
58. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-1(b)(i) (1991).
59. Id.
60. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e) et seq.
61. Id. S 1-482-2(e)(2),(3) and (4).
62. Id. S 1.482-2(e) (ii).
63. Id.
64. Id. S 1.482-2(e)(1) (iii).
65. Id. S 1.482-2(e) (2).
66. Id. § 1.482-2(e)(2)(i).
67. Levey and Ruchelman, supra note 7, at 616.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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(ii) The Resale Price Method (RPM)70
The Resale Price Method determines arm's length price by
comparing gross profit margins achieved in controlled and
uncontrolled transactions.7
The resale price method reconstructs
a market price by discounting the controlled reseller's price by
comparable gross profit margins.7 ' The equivalent arm's length
price is determined under this method by subtracting
75 an appropriate
74
profit markup"l from the applicable resale price.
76
(iii) The Cost Plus Method (CPM)

To determine the arm's length price under the Cost Plus
Method, an appropriate gross profit mark-up is added to the
seller's cost of production. 7
The Cost Plus Method is commonly
used for transfers of unfinished goods that will have substantial
value added to them by the controlled purchaser.
B. The White Paper Proposals

The Treasury Department's White Paper on transfer pricing
acknowledges that the three primary methods prescribed by § 482 are
difficult to apply and various unsatisfactory alternative methods
are commonly employed to fill the gap.' The White Paper suggests
ten proposals to aid the Service in applying § 482,80 but fails to
tackle the central dilemma of the "transfer pricing" problem: the
need to establish an acceptable method of calculating an
uncontrolled equivalent price for a particular controlled
transaction.81
The White Paper reaffirms the goals of § 482, namely to
distribute income in a manner that assures that related parties
earn the same returns that unrelated parties would earn under

70. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(3) (1991).
71. Id.
72. Levey and Ruchelman, supra note 67, at 619.
73. Id. (The appropriate profit markup is the gross profit that would be
earned in an uncontrolled transaction).
74. Id. (The applicable resale price is the anticipated uncontrolled resale
price of goods purchased at the controlled price).
75. Levey and Ruchelman, supra note 67, at 619.
76. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(4) (1991).
77. Levey and Ruchelman, supra note 67, at 620.
78. Id.
79. Philip A. stoffregen Et. Al., The BALRM Approach To Transfer Pricing:
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, TAX NoTEs, March 6, 1989, at 1258.
80. WHITS PAPEP, supra note 9, at 25-27.
81. Id.
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similar circumstances. 2 This theory is now referred to as marketbased income allocation.8 3 However market-based theory provides
no incentive to affiliated groups to capitalize on economies of
84
integration associated with affiliation.
The White Paper
85
acknowledges this criticism, but concludes that this does not
warrant a rejection of the existing arm's length methods,86
primarily for lack of workable alternatives. '
Other commentators criticize the present arm's length methods
because of inherent problems in applying a market-based approach to
transactions of integrated businesses."
The White Paper ignores
the "continuum price problem"8' as irrelevant and concludes,
"[t]ransfer prices are supposed to reflect the contribution of the
activity and assets utilized in each location to economic income.
Therefore, each affiliated member should earn at least as much as
it could have earned as an unrelated party under alternative
arrangements."'" Concerns arise in controlled transactions because
management, by setting transfer prices, can attribute profit in the
exclusive interests of profit maximization, tax minimization, or
other management reasons. This flexibility creates prices that may
each meet the arm's length criteria. 1
II. THE CONTINUUM PRICE PORBLEM
The controversy surrounding the present methods of calculating
arm's length prices stems from their failure to acknowledge that
corporations integrate for primarily economic reasons. 2
As a

82. Id. at 79.
83. Id.

84. Langbein, supra note 29, at 1318.
85. WEnTE PAPER, supra note 9., at 81.
specifically, it has been argued that the flaw in an

arm's length approach is that it does not allow a return
to the form of organization. That is, because an
integrated enterprise is presumably more efficient, it
will be able to execute an integrated economic activity
at a lower cost than a series of independent firms whose
joint efforts are necessary to execute the same series
of transactions. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.

88. see infra part II.

89. Id. See text accompanying notes 107-110.
90. Wai~z PAPER,

supra note 9,

at 81.

91. Langbein, supra note 29, at 1318.
92. Id.
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result, the component companies do not act as independent units. 93
Advocates of the continuum price problem argue that due to
economies of integration, part of income is a product of
integration itself, and therefore impossible to allocate using a
comparable uncontrolled price. 4 Therefore, each nation in which
a multinational corporation operates, may have a valid claim to the
total income generated by the economies of integration.95 Assuming
that multinational corporations select their transfer prices to
avoid United State taxes,96 the methods endorsed by tax regulations
for calculating tax reference prices arbitrarily
allocate the
7
residue of income created by integration.
Each of the three primary methods established by the
regulations presents its own problem. The CUP method is rarely
used because it is often difficult to find comparable uncontrolled
prices. 8 Similarly, results obtained by using either the RPM or
the CPM are unacceptable because they arbitrarily allocate too much
income to one or other of the affiliates of the related groups. 9
To

adapt

to

these

shortcomings,

decision-makers do

one of

two

things: Either (1) they relax nominally strict standards of
comparability in applying the CUP method, or (2) they employ a
fourth method, which entails a negotiated, arbitrary profit
split.100
The allocation of the residue of income remains a
central issue in the controversy. The Service believes it is being

93. Ecc¢zs, supra note 35, at 125. "[Companies] only buy internally for
strategic or huge cost reduction reasons. Strategy can make a huge difference
to internal transfers." Id.
94. Langbein, supra note 29, at 1318.
95. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1391.
The essential proposition is that the defect of all
current and suggested approaches ... is their reliance
on conventional economic models of the production
process. These models suggest that all income of a
multinational [corporation] must be attributable to some
"function" or "factor," or, if that is absolutely
impossible, that "residual" income has to be allocated
among components based upon criteria which are
determined ultimately by reference to production inputs.
Id. at 1392.
96. WHiTz PAPER, supra note 9, at 1. "Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code authorizes the secretary of the Treasury to allocate income, deductions, and
other tax items among related taxpayers to prevent evasion of taxes[.]" Id.
97. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1396.
98. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1395. The white Paper notes that in only 15
percent of cases has an uncontrolled price been determinable. When the figures
were weighted by dollar amounts of the adjustments involved the percentages fell
to 2 percent. Id. at 1395 n.19.
99. These problems are illustrated in: Eli Lilly Co. v. Commissioner, 856
F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988), E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. united States, 608
F. 2d 445 (Ct.Cl. 1979).
100. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1395.
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This belief has spawned government
denied this income.10'
pursuit of a solution to the
inflexibility and has inhibited
02
continuum pricing problem.1
The conceptual difficulty of the continuum price problem may
be best understood through the following example:
The problem is that, in many instances, this
of
methods
§
482
[utilizing
approach
calculating an arm's length price] does not
yield a determinate price, because the price
one determines depends upon which component of
the integrated enterprise one examines. For
instance, assume that the producing arm's cost
is 30; the distributing arm's, 20; and the
price to outside firms (the revenue from the
transaction)100. Assume on these facts, one
can determine the price that will induce the
producing arm to enter the transaction is 40
[providing a margin to the producer of 10] or
any greater price; the price to induce the
selling arm, 70 [providing a margin to the
distributer of 10] or any lower price. Thus,
any price between 40 and 70 will induce both
arms to enter the transaction. This leaves a
which cannot be
residue of income of 1 30
3
determinately allocated. 1
Frustrated with the inadequacy of prices determined under
existing § 482 methods, the Service tends to recommend and the
courts accept reallocations of income based on arbitrary
prices.1 0 4 Using the figures above as an example, the RPM would
yield a price of 70, clearly under-allocating income to the
purchasing/reselling arm, while the CPM would produce a price of 40
with the reverse effect. 0 5 The Service would split the profit,
thus arriving at a tax reference price of 55.106

Therefore, four

or five years after companies have established and implemented
transfer price policies, the Service uses its own method rather
than the methods prescribed by the regulations.

101. Langbein, supra note 29, at 1317.
102. Consider the U.S. Treasury Department's failure to act on its
acknowledgment of the Continuum Price Problem. WHIT PAPER supra note 9, at 44-45.
103. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1395.
104. Langbein, The unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, TAX NOTZs,
February 17, 1986, at 663; see also JCOT PAPER, supra note 11. (The Treasury
acknowledges the existence of judicially formulated alternative methods). Id.
105. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1396.
106. Id.
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After operating under this method for many years, the Treasury
Department conducted an investigation of intercompany pricing,
publishing their results in a white paper."'7 However, the White
Paper fails to suggest an appropriate way of allocating the residue
of income."0 8 This results in an over-allocation of income to the
parent (United States) entity. '"
While most favorable to the
United States, it may in practice produce globally undesirable
economic results.110
The Service must balance its goal of
maximizing United States, tax revenues'
with encouraging
responsible behavior on the part of multinational companies.
As there is no single determinate arm's length price, there
can be no accurate allocation of the tax base between two
countries.1112
Thus, allocation is based on an ad hoc objective
determination.1 13
Proponents of the continuum price problem
contend that the residue is substantial.4 because in practice
there is almost always a large excess of revenue over the cost
necessary to generate a marginal return to all the components of
the integrated organization."
Advocates of the Continuum Price Theory suggest a transaction
cost approach to § 482 cases would remove the arbitrary nature of
the analysis.1 6
Transaction cost theory would attribute income
to each affiliate according to its contribution to overall income
of the organization..'"
Section
482
cases
are
essentially
economic
cases.18
Transfer pricing cases are inherently factual and subjective in
nature. They require a great deal of cost, pricing and market data

107. Ws= PAPER, supra note 9.
108. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1413.
109. Id.
110. If the ARAMCO group had declared their profits in the United States,
rather than in net consuming nations, a current account crisis may have occurred,
as discussed above in note 45.
111. Langbein, supra note 29.
112. Id. at 1396.
113. Id. at 1320.
114. Langbein, supra note 29.
115. Id. at 1318.
116. See infra Part IV.
117. Id; see also infra Part IV (C).
118. Statement of James M. Kammann,. special trial attorney in the office of
the chief Counsel (Department of Treasury) before The subcommittee on oversight,
Committee on ways and Means, July 10, 1990 (discussing his experience with S 482
cases).
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regarding the taxpayer and its competitors."'
An analysis of
structure and pricing in the petroleum industry aids in
understanding the applicability of S 482 methodology.
III. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

A. Why Study The Petroleum Industry?

The petroleum industry is particularly important because of
the magnitude and volatility of its effects on the economies of net
1 20
importing countries.
Examination of supply disturbances that
occurred in the industry during 1973-74 and 1979-81 illustrate its
importance.121
In 1973, the price of crude oil increased an
average of 350 percent.122 In 1979, a second shock in oil prices
occurred following the deposition of the Shah of Iran.'
The
contract price of Arab Light12' increased from $12.79 to $28.67,
and the spot price climbed to $36 per barrel. 125
These sharp
price hikes had substantial impacts on the economies of most of the
oil-importing
industrial
countries.
The
result
was
to
significantly destabilize them.2 1
The immediate impact of the
1973 and 1979 oil price shocks on the net importing countries was
recessionary,127 resulting in declines in real Gross National
Product

(GNP)

and

elevated

unemployment."9

Both

of

these

episodes were followed by rising inflation rates.'2
The term
stagflation, a combination of recession (stagnation) and inflation,
was coined to characterize the general features of the economies 3of
the industrial world following the oil shocks of the 1970"s.12
Not only do price shocks cause stagflation, but they also impact on
a nation's current account balance and exchange rate. 3
An

119. statement of Fred T. Goldberg Jr., commissioner of Internal Revenue,
before The Subcommittee on oversight, House Committee on Ways and Means, July 10,
1990 (discussing the Treasury Department's current efforts to implement S 482).
120. See FR.MCxSco L. RIv-RA-BATIZ ANDLuis RIVERA-BATIZ, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND OPEN ECONOMY
353 (1985) ; See also WILFRED ETE ER, MoDERN INTRNATiONAL ECONOMICS 145 (1983)
121. RivERA-BATn AD RraW
BATiZ, supra note 120, at 353.
122. Id. at 353.
"[Flor instance, the price of oil, [based on the
benchmark] Saudi Arabian [light grade crude], increased from $1.90 per barrel to
$9.76, as spearheaded by the Arab oil embargo and the start of the OPEC price
hikes during the last quarter of 1973." Id.
123. Id. at 353.
MACROECONOMICS

124. Saudi Arabia exports three crude blends from two different locations.
Saudi Light is quoted F.O.B. Ras Tannurah.
125. RivERA-BATiz AN RvERA-BATIZ, supra note 120,
126. Id.
127. Id.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.

at 353/54.
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increase in the cost of oil imports would, all else being equal,
cause deterioration in a nation's current account."2 At a fixed
exchange rate this would generate a balance of payments
deficit.133
Examination of the data from the 1973 oil shock
reveals that the overall trade balance in the United States fell by
$6.2 billion, from $0.9 billion in 1973 to -$5.3 billion in
1974.134

Another effect price shocks have on a nation's current account
is increased tension between affected governments.3' The balance
of payment shifts have the greatest impact in Europe.1 6 European
countries are billed for Middle East oil in U.S. dollars.3
Therefore, the higher the value of the dollar, the more they have
to pay for oil in their own currencies. 3'
In an effort to
alleviate some of the price shock effects, European governments
demanded3 that the United States lower interest rates to inflate the
dollar. '
B. Relevant Aspects of Petroleum Industry Structure

Petroleum production and distribution is an international
industry. 4
Crude oil, the raw material, is abundant in less
developed countries. 41
In turn, it is exported to the
industrialized nations as a fundamental component of their
economies.'
The distances and transportation times between the
wells and refineries are extensive: forty-five days from the Middle
East to Europe or the United States and sixty days from the Middle

East to Japan. 43 There is an additional time component of thirty
days to refine and distribute the end products. As a result any
change in demand or supply creates an imbalance that requires a
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. WiLrRED ETizR,

135. PAUL C.
136. Id.
137. Id.

ROsERTS,

MODERE

TBB

INTERNATIO-mL EcONOMIc
s 145
SUPPLY-SIDE

REVOLuTION

(1983).

154 (1984).

138. Id. at 154 n. 3.
139. Id. at 154/55.

"The State Department, ever sensitive to the complaints

of foreigners, had actually launched a campaign against the President's tax cuts

on the grounds that international relations were at stake." Id. At the time the

united Kingdom believed higher United States tax rates would have an antiinflationary effect, by reducing interest rates.
Lower interest rates will
reduce dollar demand and thus the value of the dollar on world currency markets.
Id.
140. See Tas MABRO STUDy, supra note 18.
141. Id. at 8..
142. ETH ER, supra note 134, at 40. For example, in 19.80, united States net

oil imports represented an average of 30% of total imports, by far the largest
import commodity. Id.
143. TBE MABRO STUDY, supra note 18, at 9.
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substantial period of time to correct.'44
Normally, swings are
dampened by inventory stored throughout the system.
However,
145
increased prices have made inventory carrying costs excessive.
Consequently, stocks have been reduced. This further exacerbates
the impact of demand and supply swings. Therefore, supply is fixed
over the short term. Any disturbance in equilibrium caused by
increased or decreased demand, or changes in available supply,
substantially affects prices and produces a degree of volatility.
The marginal cost... of producing a barrel of crude oil in
the Middle East is roughly 30 to 50 cents. Since the 1973 and 1979
oil shocks, the price of oil has been without sound economic
footing. Prices were driven by the politics of the OPEC
nations.1 47
Internal quarrels between OPEC members have caused
prices to increase when the majors 141 thought
they might fall and
14
vice-versa, making prediction impossible.
The relationship of crude oil and product prices is complex.
Crude oil is refined by a range of processes to produce three basic
products: naphtha (gasoline), distillate and fuel oil,'"0 and a
large number of other products. The relative yields of the three
products and the quality of each varies with the type of crude oil.
There is a correlation between the marginal crude s' which is
generally accepted to be Arabian Light, 152 and product prices in
144. See VmX.iLz,
supra note 42, at 55.
145. See RzwRA-BATzZ MW RIv-RA-BATxZ, supra note 121, at 353.
146. Marginal cost is the addition to total cost resulting from the addition

of the last unit of output.
147. WALL ST~R JouRNAL, May 27, 1981, at 3.
"It is my crude and I will do
with it as I please." Id. (quote attributed to Sheik Yamani at the May 25, 1981,
meeting of OPEC in Geneva).
148. For the period 1971 until 1987 The "majors" were the seven major oil
companies: British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon,.Gulf (now part of Chevron), Mobil,
Shell and Texaco.
149. VmuzcER, supra note 42, at 55. In 1981, when the world expected the
price of crude to rise, internal confusion amongst the OPEC members allowed Saudi
Arabia to keep the price of crude down through the use of its surplus production
capacity. Id.

150. in an average barrel of Arabian Light there is:
38% Fuel oil

36% Gas Oil (distillate)
7%
7%

Naphtha
Premium Gasoline

6% Regalar Gasoline
Vm=EzR, supra note 42, at 267.
151. General economic theory defines the marginal crude as that barrel which
will be purchased last (i.e. the highest priced barrel produced). This has
traditionally been the Arabian crudes because of their distance from the
industrialized nations and the politics of crude produced in the industrialized
nations.
See EtwiN MANspz=z,
MicRo-EcoNomrcs TBZoRY & APPLICATIONS 472 (1985).
152. See generally THE MABRo STUwy, supra note 18.
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key markets 53 when weighted in proportion to their yield from
Arabian Light crude. The difference between the weighted product
price and the landed cost of Arabian Light crude oil in the
respective markets represents the refiner's margin.154 This is a
measure of the correlation when compared to the actual cost of
refining. 5 5
The sum of the percentages of each of the major
products that can be produced from a barrel of crude, multiplied by
its market price, is termed its gross product worth. 56 (Also
termed a netback price).
To obtain a free on board (F.O.B.)
netback price, 157 the costs of transportation and refining are
deducted from the gross product worth.
An understanding of netback pricing and the marginal nature of
Arabian crude is essential to its consideration as an uncontrolled
comparable price.
C. Comparable Uncontrolled Prices In The Petroleum Industry
The analysis of spot market prices, as comparable uncontrolled
prices for determination of a tax reference price, is divided into
two time periods because of the way the oil industry has developed.
The two significant periods are from 1973 to 1981 and from 1982 to
the present.
In 1981, a weakening of the OPEC cartel and the
advent of tax spinning'5" substantially changed the pricing
structure of the industry, 159 requiring separate analysis.
In the first period, the majority of crude was distributed
through term contracts1 " and the spot market served primarily as
a market clearing device representing between 5% to 15% of total
supply. 6' Price fluctuations on spot product markets occurred on
a day-to-day, and often minute-to-minute basis, making it difficult
to perceive rhyme or reason for the fluctuations.62' A price
could spurt on a given day, in one particular market, because a
buyer couldn't locate a seller or vice-versa. Market shifts on any
given day had little to do with the fundamentals of global supply
and demand.163
153. The markets are: New York, Rotterdam and Tokyo.
VMUZGER, supra note 42, at 268.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. An F.O.B. netback price, is calculated by taking the price of each of

154.

the products sold and multiplying it by its percentage of a barrel of crude.

158. see infra period (ii).
159. WALL STzET JowwA, May 27, 1981, at 3.
160. A term contract is a contract negotiated for a fixed period of time
with a pre-arranged price or pricing suhedule.
161. VmuGzR, supra note 42 at 263.
162. Id. at 265.
163. Id. at 265.
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In contrast, during the second period, a significant increase
in spot market activity occurred, '" and term contracts were
renegotiated to incorporate spot market pricing mechanisms. 6 5
Understanding the role of the spot market requires recognition
that, unlike any other industry, the oil industry, must achieve
supply-demand balance. Once product is removed from the ground it
Tank storage capacity is finite and
must be stored in tanks.
costly. Surpluses anywhere in the system are dispersed through the
The surplus may be a crude cargo in excess of
spot market. 6
that required to meet demand, cargos that end up in geographical
areas with insufficient demand, or cargos that when refined into
products will produce grades or qualities for which there is no
this is a highly capital intensive, low
Furthermore,
demand.
marginal cost industry. Because of enormous expenses involved in
finding oil fields, once a field is discovered companies maximize
extraction regardless of demand. A barrel that is not produced
today will not be produced until the end of the life of the well,
greatly reducing the return on investment.167 Saudi Arabian crude
is exceptional in this regard due to uncharacteristically low
marginal cost of recovery. Total recovery may also be affected
6'
because shutting down a well will result in a loss of pressure."
These factors, in addition to the low marginal cost of additional
production and refining capacity, lead to over-production, except
in crisis periods.'69
D. Are Spot Prices Representative of Transactions Within The
Industry?

(The Search for Comparable Uncontrolled Prices)
A price charged for transfer of crude oil between unrelated
parties is by definition an arm's length price.'70 An issue in
the transfer pricing cases is whether any of the arm's length
prices available in the petroleum industry, to the Service, satisfy
the requirements of a comparable uncontrolled price, as defined

164.

PmoLEuH

INT2!GE1CR WEEKLY,

February 2, 1981, at 2.

165. Id.
166. VERLZOR,supra note 42, at 265.
167. Because the development costs of a well are fixed in dollar values from

the date of discovery, to sell a barrel 20 years from now that could have been

produced today for the same price, would result in a lower return on investment
when reduced to present value.
168. Oil caverns are under high pressures prior to discovery. This pressure
By pumping water into the well, as it is extracted,
allows for easy extraction.
Shutting down the well will
the pressure is maintained forcing the oil out.
result in a loss of pressure, decreasing the total recovery and/or increasing the
cost of extraction.
169. see generally VERL.;ER, supra note 42.
170. See Treas. Reg. S 1.482-1 (1991).
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under § 1.482-2(e)(2)(ii) of the regulations.17 1
Uncontrolled
sales are considered comparable to the controlled counterparts if
the physical property and circumstances are identical or, so nearly
identical, that any difference can be reflected by a reasonable
number of adjustments. 172
Period (i) (1973-1981) Term Contracts
Until producing countries nationalized oil company operations,
and net consuming countries created state owned integrated oil
company operations, the producing countries' oil was controlled
from the wellhead to the pump by the major oil companies. 72
During this period, most contracts for oil were negotiated on a
long-term basis, with the spot market playing a minor role." 4
During period (i), spot market trades were normally transacted
at lower prices than the vast majority of transactions (the normal
scenario). 75 On the other hand, when the system was constrained
or subjected to excess demand,'" the spot market reacted upward
and reflected higher prices that were equally unreflective
of the
vast majority of transactions (the crisis scenario)." 7
This was
a result of the spot market's use as a market clearing device
during this period. 17
The table below illustrates the effect of
a systematic constraint (the 1979 oil crisis) on the spot market
price.

171. See Brief of Petitioner.
172. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(2)(ii) (1991).
173. See Brief of Respondent, at 8.

174.

see

PETRoLzum

INTLLxGENcE

WmLy,

Feb.

2,

1981,

at 2.

Spot transactions

accounted for only 5% to 15% of all crude sales during this period. Id.
175. See VERI ER, supra note 42, at 143-8.
176. For example, political interruption of crude supplies from one country;
closures of ports or slowdown of ships; interruption of supply routes such as the
suez Canal closure; reduction of refining capacity via explosion or fire; or
unpredicted increases in demand due to abnormally cold weather conditions.
177. VERLEGER, supra note 42, at 268.
178. Id.
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Crisis
Crude Prices During The 1979 Iranian
9
(In Dollars Per Barrel)1
MONTH
Oct.1978
Nov.1978
Dec.1978
Jan.1979
Feb.1979
Mar.1979
Apr.1979
May 1979
Jun.1979

OFFICIAL PRICE
ARAB LIGHT
12.70
12.70
12.30
13.34
13.48
13.98
17.25
18.14
19.68

SPOT VALUES
15.36
12.40
16.68
19.44
26.89
25.74
25.96
30.06
35.37

Under either normal or crisis scenarios which describe the
conditions that existed during this period, the evidence strongly
suggests spot market prices did not reflect average prices used by
companies for their internal or external transactions. Therefore,
spot market prices failed to meet the comparable uncontrolled price
80
criteria for period (i).'
Period (ii) (1982-1990)
Emergence of the Spot Market
The spot market price for crude did not reflect contract
prices until the advent, of tax spinning: 8' a tax avoidance device
developed by the major oil companies to contain the effects of new
tax policies introduced by the United Kingdom.'82 Spinning takes
place when an integrated company producing United Kingdom
Continental Shelf ("UKCS") oil sells all or part of its crude in
arm's length deals, rather than appropriating this oil for refining
in its own plants or transferring it to subsidiaries or
The oil company then enters the spot market to
affiliates.'83
Tax spinning substantially
satisfy its own requirements.'84
reduces the fiscal liability of an integrated company when the
price of an arm's length oil transaction is lower than the price
that would be assessed by tax authorities when oil companies
directly appropriate oil for use in their own refineries (a non-

179. VERLEGER, supra note 42 at 149.
180. See Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(2).
181. See generally THE XARO STUY, supra note 18.
182. Id. at 161.
183. Id. at 123.
184. Id.
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arm's length transaction)."'
The savings accrue because
production profits are taxed at about 95 percent, whereas refining
profits are taxed at 52 percent but, due to losses, may be shielded
from tax (i.e. 0 percent). 86
Since direct appropriation is
subject to a post-facto negotiation with the tax authorities,
spinning also provides a known and certain tax reference price.""
This creates greater planning options and reliable calculation of
margins.
Spinning developed in the early eighties and reached its
peak in 1984 and 1985.88 A major study was performed at Oxford
University analyzing the effect of spinning on the benchmark and
spot market prices of crude oil.'
From the table below, one can
see a disparity between contract and spot market prices during
selected intervals.
This disparity illustrates why the oil
companies elected to spin.
Influence of Spinning on Contract Prices8"'
(Values in United States Dollars)
BENCHMARK PRICE19 '
BRENT CRUDE

DATE
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Aug.
Jun.
Aug.
May
Jul.
May

36.25
35.00
35.10
30.00
30.10
27.90

SPOT PRICE

SPOT PRICE

BRENT CRUDE

ARABIAN LIGHT

31.95
32.19

32.10
31.84
31.26
28.56

32.33
29.47
27.78
26.74

27.43

26.80

185. Id.
186. See THE MABRO SUDY, supra note 18, at 271. For example, where there is
a $2 differential between spot and benchmark prices, $1.90 of liability is
avoided by spinning. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 191.
189.

ROBERT MABRO ET.

AL.,

Tm

MARET FOR NORTH

SEA CRUDE OIL

(1986).

190. Id. at 329-335. The benchmark prices are the term BNOC/Statoil prices
of North sea crudes (contract and spot market prices are taken from the Mabro
Study). Id.
191. The benchmark price is the value assigned by the British government to
crude oil which is used internally by the recovering company.
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2 did not
Prior to 1980, the spot market for Brent crude ..
1 3
Today Brent spot price has become a market indicator. 9
exist.
Reasons for its emergence include: the decline of term contracting
starting in 1979, the pressure for short-selling in a falling
market, the rapid growth of North Sea production, structure of UKCS
fiscal regimes, and the role of the British National Oil Company
(BNOC) in setting prices and disposing of substantial volumes of
UKCS production 194
available through taking its royalties in kind
instead of cash.

North Sea oil represents less than 2 percent of total reserves
with OPEC retaining 67 percent of known reserves."'5 The advent
of spinning and percentage of Brent crude traded on the spot market
in proportion to total production has resulted in its dominance as
an indicator of crude oil prices.'96 Because of its proximity to
major consuming nations, marginal producers have been forced to
97
resort to Brent spot prices as a basis for their own pricing.'
Roughly two-thirds of world supply of crude oil is now spot in some
sense. 198 It is estimated that perhaps one third of volume moves
in bonafide short-term third-party transactions and another one
9
The remaining
third under specifically spot-related pricing."'
one third consists of more official orientated equity oil, 20" and
The advent of -dry
a few non-spot related term contracts. 20 1
barrel0 2 trading added another element of risk to the market.
Eight million of the twenty million barrels per day traded on the
futures market in 1984 were dry barrels.20'

192. Brent is the name given to one of the-largest oil fields in the North
sea. As a result the price of Brent crude has become a market indicator for
North sea crude prices.
193. Tas MABRO Smmy, supra note 18 at 161. Trading in Brent spot and forward
markets has become an accepted measure of an arm's length crude oil price. Brent
plays a barometric role in the pricing of other North Sea crudes and may have an
influence on economic behavior in the world petroleum scene outside the North
sea. Id.
194. Id. at 161-63.
195. Id. at 6.
196. See Id. at 240.
197. See Id. at 161.
198. PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Special supplement April 22, 1985, at 3.
(hereinafter PIW].
199. Id.
200. This includes long-term contracts, strategic petroleum reserves and oil
produced and consumed by national governments.
201. PIW, supra note 198.
202. A dry barrel is a future transaction for a barrel of crude that has not
been lifted.203. PIW supra note 198 at 3. For example, a Brent cargo to be loaded in
March of 1984 was first traded in the previous December and was bought and sold
by 24 trading entities in 36 deals over a period of a few months. Id.
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Spinning is an unnecessarily volatile pricing exposure for the
industry which United Kingdom government fiscal policy could have
avoided. 20 4
Agreements with the oil companies establishing
transfer prices for Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) purposes at market
levels would eliminate the problem.
Spinning creates a strong
downward bias in spot market prices because of the incentive to
trade out of the an artificial barrier 215 created around upstream
profits by the United Kingdom government, at the lowest possible
price. 206
Excess spot market activity has subjected the industry to high
levels of volatility.20 7
Furthermore, excessive participation in
the spot market, heretofore not a factor in the industry, invited
speculators and formal establishment of a futures market purely for
the purpose of speculation. 20 8
This too has markedly increased
volatility. In every other commodities industry, the purpose of
futures markets is to stabilize costs so that end product prices
will not vary. In the oil industry, futures trading thrives on
long-term price volatility and dies when prices are stable. The
futures market, therefore, serves only to reduce product price
stability, not increase it. As already discussed above, because of
long lines of supply (90 days from the well to the pump); minimum
inventory buffers due to their high cost; and high risk and
unpredictability of demand, the industry is prone to excessive
reaction to volatile prices.
Spot prices may be more
representative of industry patterns in this period due to the
higher volumes of crude traded on the market (33%) and the advent
of spot based term contract pricing, but this in fact causes untold
economic impacts on world economies.20 9
These factors must be

204. See Id.
205. The barrier is known as the "ring-fence." It is an artificial tax
barrier the United Kingdom government created around upstream profits in the

petroleum industry. The purpose was to prevent oil companies using *paper"
downstream losses to reduce there upstream tax liability. upstream activities
include exploration and exploitation of wells.
Downstream activities are
refining and distribution.
206. See generally TH MASRo STU=Y, supra note 18. For example, an oil company
enters into separate transactions to buy and sell cargoes in August for November
delivery at $40/barrel (assuming the bench mark price was above the spot price).
If market price drops to $28/barrel as November approaches the company will
prefer to close out the $40/barrel trade rather than elect to use it as a spin.
It can then enter into a subsequent trade at a lower price and use that trade as
its spin. The price of the cargo the oil company sells in its spin is the price
at which the company is taxed when it leaves the ring-fence, since oil companies
are the major participants in the market an incentive and mechanism exists to use
the lowest achievable price. This creates the downward bias.
207. TuE MABRO ST=Y, supra note 18, at 244.
208. Id.
209. A recent example is found in Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
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establishing spot prices as tax reference

There are many unique aspects of crude as a commodity and
factors that influence the price of crude oil. The relationship
between spot market price for crude and term prices commands great
influence over the application of § 482 to transfer pricing in the
oil industry.
IV. APPLICATION OF I.R.C. § 482 To THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

Internal Revenue Code S 482 establishes a broad standard for
determining when transfer prices are unreasonable.21 The text of
5 482 limits its application to cases of tax evasion or where
reallocation is necessary to assure that the income of a related
taxpayer is reflected on its tax return.212
The scope of § 482
has been expanded beyond the plain meaning of the text by both the
Service and the courts.
The Service has promulgated regulations
allowing for
reallocation where a taxpayers' income does not reflect the income
it would have earned in a comparable arm's length transactions.213
The-Service fails to account for error in the comparison that may
result form the economic benefits of integration.
Thus, S 482
reallocations may not truly reflect income.214
The courts have expanded the scope of S 482 by interpreting
the evasion standard to include tax avoidance.215
This is
justified on the basis that 5 482 is a non-punitive provision and
thus the terms evasion and avoidance may be interchanged.216 The
courts' reasoning continues
that transactions between one
controlled taxpayer and another should be subject to special
scrutiny to ascertain whether the common control is being used to
reduce, avoid or escape taxes. 21 " A more accurate summation would
be that the purpose of S 482 is to prevent reduction or avoidance
of United States taxation.
The Commissioner's power to reallocate income extends both to
cases

of

intended

and

inadvertent

shifting

of

income.2'

An

210. See Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2.
211.

see I.R.C. S 482 (1986).

212. Id.
213. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-1(a)(6).
214. See D. Kevin Dolan, Intercompany Transfer Pricing For The Layman, TAX
NoTzs, October 8, 1990, at 211, 214; see also Langbein supra note 29.
215. Stewart v. Commissioner, 714 F.2d 977, 987 (9th cir. 1983).
216. Foster v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 34,158 (1983).
217. Foster v. commissioner, 756 F.2d 1430,1432 n.1 (9th cir. 1985).
218. See Eli Lilly & CO. v. C.I.R., 856 F.2d 855,860 (7th cir. 1988).
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understanding of the extent of the Commissioner's authority to
reallocate income, beyond the intended scope of § 482, would appear
imperative to the major oil companies.
The discussion of the
ARAMCO cases will question whether in fact transfer prices were
used to reduce a controlled taxpayers' taxable income. The data
will show that in some instances controlled taxpayers taxes were in
fact increased through mandatory deceleration of income in higher
tax jurisdictions, even though their United States taxes were
reduced.
A. An Analysis of Uncontrolled Comparable Prices
In The Petroleum Industry
As discussed above, the standard by which transfer prices are
"'
scrutinized is the arm's length standard.21
Can the Commissioner
use spot market prices as a standard to evaluate transfer prices in
the petroleum industry under current law?
Use of pure spot prices as comparable uncontrolled prices
would subject the taxpayer to prices that are uncharacteristically
low during normal periods and high during crisis periods.22 The
treasury regulations require that sales used in determining arm's
length prices be realistic.2 21 Uncontrolled sales do not include
sales at unrealistic prices. 222 "With respect to the arm's length
standard, a requirement the IRS must satisfy is it may not be
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. '22' There is substantial
evidence that during both period (i) and, to some extent, during
period (ii) the spot market prices did not represent realistic
comparable
uncontrolled
prices. 22
The
evaluation
of
reasonableness relies on the standard for comparability.125 Term
contracts are for the sale of large volumes of crude over long
periods of time.
The spot market is used as either a market
clearing device for small volumes of crude or as a tax avoidance
device for small amounts of crude.
The "same circumstances
requirement" is not met. 226 This argument is further strengthened

219. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-1 (1991).
220. See supra, part IV(c)(i) & (ii).

221. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(2)(ii) (1991).
222. Id.
223. Statement of Frances Zuniga, of the California Franchise Tax Board
before The subcommittee On oversight of the House Committee On Ways and Means,
July 10, 1990 (discussing his experiences with section 482 cases).

224. See supra test accompanying period (i) and period (ii).
225. Levey and Ruchelman, supra note 7, at 616. "Comparability exists if
substantially the same products are sold under the same circumstances, or if
differences in the property or circumstances either have no effect on prices or

can be measured and eliminated with a reasonable number of adjustments."
226. See Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(2) (1991).

Id.
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by the existence of term arm's length contracts in the petroleum
industry.227
The courts have overruled § 482 reallocations by the
Commissioner only if found to be arbitrary, capricious or
When a taxpayer rebuts the presumption of
unreasonable.2"'
reasonableness afforded the Commissioner's determinations, the Tax
Court must determine whether the taxpayer's own allocations conform
Use of term arm's length
to the arm's length requirement. 229
comparable
parallels 231the
more
closely
prices
contract230
uncontrolled price standard than do spot prices.
Term arm's length prices did, and still do, exist. A possible
solution to the problem of acquiring this information-would be to
require all companies importing oil into the United States to
report relevant transaction data for each cargo to the Service.
The
Other consuming nations have adopted similar solutions.23 2
Service would have each company's results as a basis for
Thus, the Service could better determine whether
comparison.
controlled prices reflect market conditions. Further, allocation
biases could be determined, such as: selective importation of (i)
low profit crudes; (ii) high cost crudes (spot or term); or (iii)
high freight charges (smaller cargo sizes) into higher tax
jurisdictions.233

The industry includes both spot and term contracts negotiated
at arm's length. Spot market trades are by definition arm's length
transactions. In addition, other arm's length term contracts exist
between the majors and between governments and the majors. The
prices at which these transactions occur remain beyond the public
However, the British government
domain for competitive reasons.
requires oil companies to report all transfer, term and spot
contract prices quarterly.23 4 Throughout Europe, governments have
established national oil companies, providing the pricing data
The British National Oil Company (BNOC)
needed for taxation.
converted from receiving royalties in cash to taking them in kind

227. See Infra section IV (b); see also Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(1)(iii)
(1991).
228. Eli Lilly and Co. v. C.I.R., 856 F.2d 855 (7th cir. 1988).
229. Id. at 860.
230. Term arm's length contracts are long-term contracts negotiated between
unrelated parties.
231. See Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(2) (1991).
232. See TE MAsRO STUDY, supra note 18, at 93.
233. For example, if one company imports 100% spot cargoes at elevated
prices where other companies had a mix of spot and term, reallocation seems
appropriate. See Treas. Reg. S1.482-2(e)(2) (1991).
234. Id.
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This enables the government to participate in spot and term markets
and maintain independent pricing data.2"'
Assuming that term prices satisfactorily meet § 482
requirements for a comparable uncontrolled price, the problem most
often cited by the Service is difficulty in collecting data for
determination of arm's length price.131
European importing
countries have obtained this data for years. They require complete
reporting of all costs to support product price regulation and
income tax regulation on all imports.
In addition, much
statistical data is available in detailed industry publications
prepared primarily for the oil companies.""
There is no
suggestion here of a need for a U.S. national oil company.
Feasible government controls238 would provide enough leverage to
ensure accurate reporting. This solution is, however, subject to
the assumption that such reporting could be implemented without
infringement of the rights held by United States companies under
current law.
B. The Pass-Through System

(i) The ARAMCO Cases (1979-81)
The foregoing discussion does not account for tax treatment of
transfers of crude oil between foreign affiliates of United States
corporations. The primary issue in these intra-corporate transfers
is the United States' right to tax income generated in the purchase
and sale of crude oil wholly outside its borders when transfer
prices are established by local law. This issue is the subject of
the pending ARAMCO cases.239
The Service's challenge to the transfers arose from the
selling price, of crude oil sold by the Saudi Arabian Government to
the ARAMCO shareholders between 1979 and 1981.240 According to a
source at one of the major oil companies, the four Aramco partners
were able to buy crude oil at $28 a barrel during a three year

235. In France the national oil company is ELF Acquitane;

in Italy, the

company is INI; in Norway, the company is STATOIL; and in Spain, it is CEPSA.
236. Statement of Edward Romoff, a CPA with the IRS in California, before
the Oversight subcommittee of the House ways and Means committee July 10, 1990,

(discussing his experiences with section 482 cases); statement of Louis Milano,

an international examiner with the IRS in New Jersey, before The Oversight
Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee July 1990. (Discussing his

experiences with section 482 cases).
237. E.g. PETozU IELLZGENCZ WEEKLY; PLATT'S OILGPM SERVICE.
238. For example, establishing criteria for bidding on offshore licenses,
product price regulations, etc.
239. see supra note 1.
240. Brief of Respondent.
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set by the

OPEC

period instead of

at the

$34

official

price

countries.241

The above referenced, official market price, was related to
the spot market prices. The Saudi Arabian dominance of petroleum
During this
markets reduced other OPEC crudes to the margin.
The
period a transition to F.O.B. netback pricing occurred.
official OPEC price was the price of marginal crude, which was
essentially an F.O.B netback price influenced by spot market
pricing. As discussed above, spot influenced prices fail to meet
the § 482 criteria. Aside from the inappropriate nature of the
Services suggested arm's length price current law may still prevent
reallocation.
The tacit agreement between the ARAMCO shareholders and the
Saudis required that the crude be distributed according to precrisis proportional consumption of Saudi crude by consuming
The cost savings were to be passed through to
nations. 242
consuming nations. 24' The discount contracts prohibited companies
from reselling to overseas subsidiaries at higher prices.244
Recent developments in § 482 case law may prevent reallocation
Procter and Gamble held that a
under theses circumstances.245
taxpayer who could not pay royalties to a related party because of
a restriction imposed by a foreign government should not be subject
The court
to a § 482 reallocation be the Commissioner.
acknowledged that § 482 requires the controlled group to have
Where the distortion results from a
distorted its income.
restriction imposed by law, and not the controlled taxpayer, no
reallocation should be permitted.
The Service argues that, while restricted by the Saudi
government, the recipient nations were not subject to the Saudi
contracts, thus the ARAMCO shareholders were able to sell their
products at higher prices, substantially increasing their United
Through these cases, the Service intends to
States profits. 246
The Service contends that, if the
capture the lost revenues.247
oil companies had sold crude to their affiliates at official market
prices, profits would have been shifted to their United States
affiliates.246

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

CH cAGo TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 1988, at Cl.
Brief of Petitioner.
See supra INTRODUCTION (A) The Complexity.
CsicAro TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 1988, at Cl.
Procter and Gamble Co. v. C.I.R., 95 T.C. 323 (U.S.T.C. 1990).
Brief of Respondent.
Id.

248. Id.
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Although not bound by a contractual relationship, the oil
companies, business relationship with the Saudis required that the
tax benefits be passed through to consuming nations. "Without more
disclosure, tax experts are unable to determine whether the lower
price might have been viewed by the I.R.S. as helping Texaco report
higher profits in low-tax countries or whether the I.R.S.
considered the value of the discounted transactions between foreign
affiliates a constructive dividend that should have been paid to
the U.S. parent." 249 The issue is whether the oil companies could
or should have, sold the crude oil to their affiliates at official
OPEC price. The Tax Court has held that § 482 does not apply where
restrictions imposed by law, and not the actions of the controlling
interest, results in a non-arm's length allocation of income within
a controlled group. 2 ° A showing by the ARAMCO shareholders that
they were bound by the restrictions imposed by the Saudi Arabian
government should result in the reallocations being overruled.
Noting that the aforementioned arrangement forced the oil companies
to allow the full tax benefits of the discount contracts to pass
through to the consuming nations, 25' and that oil companies
operate in both consuming and producing nations by invitation, one
can conclude that transfer prices were not established by the
controlled taxpayers.25 2 This lack of control should warrant an
extension of the principles of Procter and Gamble 22 to these
cases.

Irrespective of the control issue there is evidence to rebut
the Services claim that the taxpayers were reducing or avoiding
taxes. The tax rates charged by the countries which benefited from
the lower prices were not all lower than United States corporate
tax rates.25 4
Reallocation requires that the Commissioner
demonstrate that the company in question used its control to
reduce, avoid or escape taxation.255
In order for the tax
avoidance argument to prevail, the recipient tax jurisdiction must
have a lower corporate tax rate than the United States. Since this
was not always the case, the Service's theory that transfer prices
were contrived to shift profits in order to lower tax jurisdictions
fails.25 5 From this data, it can be argued that the oil companies

249. N w YoRx TINms, Jan. 15, 1988, at 4D, col. 1.

250. Procter and Gamble co. v. C.I.R., 95 T.C. 323 (U.S.T.C. 1990) motion
for reconsideration and full court review den'd T.C.M. 1990-638 (U.S.T.C. filed
Dec. 19, 1990).
251. Brief of Petitioner, Texaco, Inc. v. C.I.R., No. 24855-89 (U.S.T.C.
filed Dec. 21, 1990).
252. See Id.
253. 95 T.C. 323 (U.;.T.C. 1990).
254. The U.S. corporate tax rate was 50%.
MASRO

STuvm,supra note 18.
255. I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
256. Id.

The U.K. tax rate was 52%.
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intended to maintain essential lines of supply by transferring into
both higher and lower tax jurisdictions, according to guidelines
set by the purchase agreements.
The Service's post-facto reallocation of profits, whose
declaration in the United States would cause substantial future
hardship for the oil companies, would subject the companies to
double taxation.
(ii) The General Debate
The purchase of crude oil by United States based trading
affiliates of a United States company, from a foreign government
for sale to a foreign affiliate, should produce minimal taxable
The oil companies operate in
income in the United States.
producing and consuming nations by government invitation and are
Although purchasing nations enjoy
subject to strict controls.
convenient use of oil companies' distribution systems, the
governments would soon initiate direct trading with producing
nations if the United States oil companies began to sell crude at
above cost to their downstream affiliates. The consuming countries
would consider this to be a declaration of offshore profits.
Requiring United States companies to set transfer prices for crude
oil which is not distributed to United States affiliates at above
cost would result in affiliates losing competitive position in
world markets. In practice, it would not seem logical for Saudi
oil sold in Germany to be subject to taxation by a third
jurisdiction. The tax court has overruled reallocations by the
Commissioner where pricing restrictions were imposed by importing
profit
A legal restriction on control of
countries. 2 1
distribution should prevent a reallocation under § 482.259
The Service makes valid arguments to justify its claims to a
portion of these profits. First, the oil rights resulted from the
The
ARAMCO agreement, originally a contractual relationship.
contracts were between ARAMCO and the Saudi government. It was the
United States affiliates that owned the ARAMCO shares. Since the
ARAMCO shareholders controlled the destination of the crude oil,
they should be subject to taxation on the profits. 5 9 The Service
thus contends that since the trading activity or control was

257. L.E. Shunk Latex Products, Inc. v. C.I.R., 18 T.C. 940 (1952); Lehman
V. C.I.R., 25 T.C. 629 (1955); C.I.R. v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S.
394 (1972).
258. L.E. Shunk Latex Products, Inc. v. C.I.R., 18 T.C. 940 (1952); C.I.R.
v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394 (1972); Cf. Treas. Reg. 5 1.482If the receipt of the income by the U.S. affiliate is prohibited by
1(a)(6).
commercial agreement and not by law, than an allocation under section 482 is not
barred. Id.
259. LUCUS v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Vercio v. C.I.R., 73 TC 1246, 1253
(1980).
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exercised in the United States, some income must be imputed for
these services.2 60
The Service's contentions are subject to challenge by virtue
of amount of control exercised. The Saudi government started to
nationalize the ARAMCO oil company in the late sixties, retaining
the ARAMCO partners as a first source of distribution. While this
privilege, or agency relationship, was a product of the earlier
contractual relationship, the contracts had little or no value as
a result of the nationalization. The ARAMCO partners were being
tested by the Saudis for retention, and their performance on the
demand to pass through profits to the Europeans was a necessary
prerequisite for retention of distribution privileges. The Saudis
could have sold their oil directly to the European governments,
placing in question the value of the agency relationship. The oil
companies' employment was conditioned on maintaining the passthrough nature of the pricing mechanism.
This defeats the
contention that income should be attributed to the relationship.
The service provided by the United States trading partners was
merely to assure that the oil was distributed between the
affiliates according to pre-crisis apportionments. Little value
can realistically be attributed to this activity.
2 61
C. Transaction Cost Analysis of the Pass-Through Cases

Advocates of the continuum price problem propose an
alternative solution to the inadequacies of the current law S
482.262
The approach has characterized the traditional arm's
length
methods,
discussed
above,
as
a
production
cost
methodology.263
Under that approach, income or profits are
localized by their attribution to localized factors.26 4
The
transaction cost orientation, by contrast, acknowledges that what
is produced by factors and functions in one place may be
jeopardized
by
non-integrated
operations
in
another.265
Integration that obviates the risk deserves some credit. 26" This
theory calls for a close examination of the reasoning behind

260. Brief of Respondent, at 17-18.
261. Stanley I. Langbein, Transaction Cost, Product Cost, and Tax Transfer
Pricing, TAx NoTs, September 18, 1989, at 1391 (the Transaction Cost solution to
the transfer pricing problem was developed by Professor Langbein and first

explained in the above mentioned article).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1392.

264. Id. (Traditionally these factors have been formulated through analysis
of market forces in transactions where the parties act independently of each
other).
265. Id. at 1392.
266. Id.
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forward integration.267
The purpose of integration is to reduce
risk by increasing control of lines of production. 268
In the
petroleum industry, it is most desirable to control production from
the well head to the pump.
The transaction cost approach to transfer pricing problems
recognizes the value of production economies resulting from forward
integration.269
Under the forward integration approach it is
assumed that each undertaking of a multinational corporation has an
economic purpose which derives some benefit to an aspect of the
operation. The benefit derived by an activity should be allocated
a return on investment which is subject to taxation. While the
earlier analysis of the continuum price problem suggested there was
a residual of income attributable to the organization form, the
transaction cost analysis helps to visualize
this residue and
20
suggests it be attributed to its source.
The solution to the problem of allocating this residual may be
found by analyzing the reasons for forward integration. In the
petroleum industry, the downstream operations are- a necessary
precursor to bidding for exploration licenses.
No country will
sell rights to a company that could not move the oil.
While no
concrete values can be attributed to these operations, educated
estimates may be used. This would not be uncharacteristic of § 482
analysis, where it is common to estimate values. There are other
externalities to consider, such as undertaking unprofitable
investments to protect other corporate interests. A system is
sought where allocation of profit between tax jurisdictions
reflects each entity's contribution to generating the overall
income. This fractional apportionment theory, however, is subject
to one major drawback.
It requires a system developed on a
multinational scale.
It also requires agreement between all
participating tax jurisdictions in the industry.
Proponents of the transaction cost approach believe that the
solution to the ambiguities of the existing arm's length
methodologies will be found in a flexible, workable apportionment
regime. The arm's length principle gives guidance only in the rare
circumstance where the behavior of unrelated parties approximates
that of related parties, a scenario clearly never present in the
petroleum industry.

267. Id.
Forward integration can best be defined, in this context, as
control by the owners of primary resources of all factors of production through
final consumer purchases of end products. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1407.
"(I]f an organization functions to protect or produce
income, such income as is so produced, or preserved, is, perforce, attributed

to the corporate form." Id.
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D. Continuum Price Analysis of the Petroleum Industry

Finally, the remaining question is whether the continuum price
problem exists in the petroleum industry and whether the
transaction cost approach is workable in such a highly politically
motivated industry. Absent governmental constraint, a continuum of
prices would exist in the petroleum industry, all of which would
reflect § 482 arm's length criteria.2"'
However, the unique
elements of petroleum industry pricing substantially diminish the
size of the continuum. Through political control, consuming and
producing nations remove the arbitrary nature of petroleum industry
transfer prices.
While the result is a politically induced
transfer price, rather than an arbitrary post-facto allocation, it
still fails to reflect income.
It is, however, practical and
workable.
How much income is really at stake in petroleum industry
transfer pricing? "Profits that more than cover the opportunity
cost of capital are known as economic rents."127
"Royalties
[payable to the U.K government for North Sea Crude] are treated by
some economists as a tax and by others as a rent levied on the
owner."273
Post 1976 royalties were 12.5 percent of the landed
value of production. 2 4 Royalties amounted to 12.5 percent of the
gross revenues. 275
After the deduction of royalties, the
government deducts a petroleum revenue tax (PRT). (Its primary
purpose is to act a natural resource depletion allowance). Between
1979 and 1982 the PRT was 70 percent, but was raised to 75 percent
after 1982.27' The cost of producing a barrel of Brent crude in
1987 was $2.20 per barrel.277
The United Kingdom corporate tax
rate has fluctuated between 52 percent between 1982-1985 and 35
percent between 1986-1987.218
The United Kingdom government has
placed a "ring-fence" around upstream oil operations. This means
that an oil company cannot offset losses incurred elsewhere in the
United Kingdom or in the rest of the world against the profits from
United Kingdom production. The ring-fence and PRT result in an
average barrel of crude netting profits of approximately 9 percent
of the landed value as shown in the table below. Economic rent,
therefore, relieves the selling entity of a substantial portion of
the unallocated income or residue.

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

see generally Langbein supra note 29.
RicsARD BRurznLY AND STmA

Tz MAsRO STUDy,

Id.
Id.

276. Id. at 116.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 118.

MXERs,

supra note 18,

PRizcipus OF Coapom=

at 111.

FzzAcE

227 (1984).
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The delicate relationship between the producing nations and
the oil companies limits the amount of redistribution that can
occur under United States law without subjecting the United States
Limitations placed on profit
companies to double taxation.
allocation by foreign host governments, while not eliminating the
benefits of integration, do not allow for corporate redistribution
for tax avoidance purposes.
The second factor that causes price rigidity in the petroleum
industry is the regulation of end-product prices by consuming
Crude is traded in dollars,27 " therefore,
nations' governments.
consuming nations constantly risk balance of payments crises
By controlling
brought on by large changes in product prices.
product prices the governments can stabilize the inflationary
effect of price shocks on their economies. This control forces the
industry to absorb a substantial portion of the negative impact of
a price shock.
Consuming nations control product prices
competitively through participation in the downstream portion of
the industry and by strict enforcement of end product price
ceilings. However, control of product prices substantially limits
Within the confines of this highly
revenues downstream.
competitive, heavily regulated industry, profit margins are small.
Therefore, revenues are generated through volume.
Between high economic rents, suppressed product prices and
demands for cost-based transfers on crude by consumer governments,
only a narrow margin of unallocated income remains subject to
transfer pricing policies. However, the petroleum industry is a
Even
high volume industry (30 million barrels consumed daily).
minute variations in price create large swihgs in the income at
stake.
To further understand the continued existence of price
rigidity in the industry, one must note the importance of market
Traditionally, profits have been taken on upstream
share.
production for tax reasons which date back to when the Service
permitted depletion allowances, in order to encourage resource
However, in order to bid on exploration licenses,
development.
companies must prove their distribution capacity, as represented by
market share of product sales. During the 1979 oil crisis, the
ARAMCO shareholders were forced to accept Saudi terms to ensure
The industry's highly
consideration for future contracts.
competitive nature necessitates expenditures in low or negative
return ventures to establish the outlets required to bid on oil
licenses. While fractional apportionment of profits would be more
equitable for international tax purposes, such redistribution can
not equitably occur without negotiated settlements with importing
and exporting nations.

279. see supra note 42.
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The foregoing analysis shows that all or most profit related
to production, refining and sale of petroleum products accrues in
the producing country tax jurisdictions. Proponents of transaction
cost or fractional apportionment methods of regulating transfer
pricing make a valid argument by suggesting that, because each
source participates in the production of income, the return on
their percentage participation should be subject to taxation in its
resident jurisdiction. However, in this highly political industry
the likelihood of an agreement that would allow for such
methodology to be implemented appears small. On the residual that
is free for allocation, arguments that refining and distribution
arms of the industry function to protect the asset specifications
selected by the industry would validate even a unilateral
redistribution of profit.
The redistribution must, however, be
limited to that portion which is free from regulatory control
(assuming it can be separated).
Any other redistribution would
require prior agreement between the participating governments. To
apply transaction cost methodology unilaterally or retroactively
would result in double taxation.
V. CONCLUSION

After examining the statutory arm's length requirements, the
continuum price problem, a model of the petroleum industry and the
availability of comparable uncontrolled prices in the industry,
this comment suggests that true uncontrolled comparables are not
readily available in the petroleum industry. The problem arises
because of industry structure and, in particular, because of the
downward bias in spot prices.
The issue for the tax courts is
whether the United States has a right to tax sales where the United
States affiliate of a multinational corporation merely acts as a
trader. Evidence presented suggests that this not only produces
double taxation, but constraints placed on pricing by producing and
consuming governments substantially negate any return on the
parent's capital investment when measured under existing law
standards. Thus, pursuant to the reasoning in Procter and Gamble,
reallocation would appear inappropriate.
A solution to future petroleum industry transfer pricing
problems might be to establish a system where all transaction data
is submitted to the Service.
Tax reference prices could be
negotiated, while avoiding most of the objections regarding
continuum pricing.
Under such a contingency, arm's length
methodology would appear workable within this very unique and
influential industry.
However, the result would be somewhat
artificial under a transaction cost analysis because of the heavy
emphasis on upstream profit taking in the industry. Each segment
of the industry serves its purpose.
If a workable fractional
apportionment scheme could be developed, it might be more realistic
than existing methods.
James Daryl Gassenheimer

